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On February 26, 2012, George Zimmerman attacked and fatally shot Trayvon 
Martin in Sanford, Florida.1 The seventeen-year-old boy was only carrying an 
Arizona Iced Tea and a bag of Skittles when Zimmerman killed him.2 In 2013, 
Zimmerman was charged, inter alia, with second-degree murder in Florida v. 
Zimmerman.3 That July, a six-person jury found Zimmerman not guilty on all 
charges.4 The night of the verdict was a turning point that shifted the minds of 
many in Black America. That night, Alicia Garza, a civil rights activist and 
community organizer, wrote in a Facebook post “a love letter to black people.”5 
In that post, she affirmed the Black community of its worth, writing “black lives 
matter.” The phrase had never before been used.6 
On August 9, 2014, a different shift happened––this time, a shift in the 
movement of Black America. In Ferguson, Missouri, police officer Darren Wilson 
killed Michael Brown, an eighteen-year-old Black boy, by gunshot.7 Ferguson 
became ground zero, as a nationwide movement against police brutality and anti-
Black racism engulfed the United States of America. That same year, police killed 
forty-three-year-old Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York,8 and twelve-year-old 
Tamir Rice in Cleveland, Ohio.9 Eric Garner, Mike Brown, and Tamir Rice joined 
Trayvon Martin in becoming household names and faces. The stories of those and 
other Black men and boys killed by the police became “an impetus for public 
 
1 Trayvon Martin Shooting Fast Facts, CNN (Oct. 9, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/06/05/us/trayvon-martin- shooting-fast-facts/index.html. 
2 Leo Benedictus, How Skittles became a symbol of Trayvon Martin’s innocence, THE GUARDIAN 
(July 15, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2013/jul/15/skittles-trayvon-
martin-zimmerman-acquittal. 
3 Trayvon Martin Shooting Fast Facts, supra note 1. 
4 Id. 
5 See Alicia Garza, THE PURPOSE OF POWER (2020). 
6 Garza is the co-creator of #BlackLivesMatter and the Black Lives Matter Global Network. It 
should be noted that the Network’s co-creators––Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi––are 
all Black women. BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com. 
7 Timeline of Events in shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 8, 
2019), https://apnews.com/article/9aa32033692547699a3b61da8fd1fc62. 
8 Daniel Pantaleo killed Eric Garner by illegal chokehold. Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: 
The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric- garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html. 
9 Timothy Loehmann killed Tamir Rice in less than two seconds after arriving on the scene where 
Rice was playing with a toy gun. Shaila Dewan and Richard A. Oppel Jr., In Tamir Rice Case, 
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policy debates on the future of police in America.”10 
While Black America was rightfully disturbed by the unjust police killings of 
Black men and boys, the country was largely silent about the 2014 police killings 
of several Black women and girls, including Gabriella Nevarez, Aura Rosser, 
Michelle Cusseaux, and Tanisha Anderson.11 Recognizing the lack of discussion 
and visibility of Black women and girls, the African American Policy Forum and 
the Center for Intersectionality and Social Policy Studies launched the 
#SayHerName campaign in December 2014.12 The campaign works to bring 
awareness and visibility to these Black women and girls and their stories and 
support a gender-inclusive approach to racial justice that centers all Black lives 
equally.13 
The conversation about police brutality in the United States centers on Black 
men and boys and how they are systematically criminalized and feared by the 
state and the country. Black women and girls have also been killed by the police 
and disproportionately subjected to police brutality; however, their names and, 
much more, their stories are rarely heard. Neither the “killings of Black women, 
nor the lack of accountability for them, have been widely elevated as exemplars of 
the systemic police brutality that is currently the focal point of mass protest and 
policy reform efforts.”14 This disparity in discourse indicates that Black women 
and their experiences are invisible. 
Part II of this article defines and outlines intersectionality, the legal theory 
through which society and the law see Black women and their unique 
experiences. Part III uses the intersectionality framework to examine the unique 
challenges Black women face in the domains of employment discrimination and 
police brutality. Part IV examines, through the lens of narrative and storytelling, 
how historically false narratives have contributed to existing intersectional 
injustices Black women face in employment discrimination and police brutality. 
Part V argues that until society and the law acknowledge and account for the lies, 
omissions, and their implications for Black women, Black women will continue to 
suffer from invisibility. By unearthing the lies and contextualizing them, society 
and the law can be better informed on how to address and remedy the injustices 
brought on by intersectional issues. 
 
 
10 Kimberlé Crenshaw and Andrea J. Ritchie, Say Her Name: Resisting Police Brutality Against 
Black Women, AFRICAN AMERICAN POLICY FORUM 1 (2015), https://www.aapf.org/sayhername. 
[hereinafter Say Her Name Report]. 
11 Id. 
12 #SayHerName Campaign, AFRICAN AMERICAN POLICY FORUM, https://aapf.org/sayhername. 
13 Say Her Name Report, supra note 10, at 6. 
14 Id. at 1. 
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In 1989, Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw introduced the legal theory of 
intersectionality in her seminal article, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race 
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics.15 In the article, Crenshaw explained how race and 
gender often interact to create multiple dimensions of experiences for Black 
women in the workplace.16 Centering on three employment discrimination 
cases,17 Crenshaw criticized the failure of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (“Title VII”) to accommodate plaintiffs at the intersection of two or more 
protected categories (i.e., race and sex), the judiciary’s narrow view of 
discrimination, and how single-issue analyses harmfully limit how the law 
considers both racism and sexism.18 Through this theoretical framework, 
Crenshaw discussed how Black women face discrimination in ways that are 
unique from the discrimination Black men or white women face.19 Black women 
often face “double-discrimination––the combined effects of practices which 
discriminate on the basis of race” and also “discrimination as Black women––not 
the sum of race and sex discrimination, but as Black women.”20 This framework 
has evolved, particularly in social discourse, to discuss intersectional identities of 
all kinds, yet the theory’s roots–– Black women at the intersection of race and 
gender––inform the discussion in this article. 
 
III. INTERSECTIONAL CHALLENGES IN 2021 
 
This section explores two key domains in which intersectional issues arise: 
employment discrimination and police brutality. First, this section discusses Black 
women’s experiences with employment discrimination by examining Title VII, its 
interpretation, and shortcomings. This section also reviews intersectionality’s 
legal status by examining race-based hair discrimination cases. Second, this 
section explores the similarities and differences in how Black men and women 
experience police brutality and the importance of acknowledging and correcting 
the notable absence of Black women in police brutality discourse. 
 
15 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 139 (1989). 
16 Id. 
17 DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Moore v. Hughes 
Helicopter, 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983); Payne v. Travenol, 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982). 
18Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 152. 
19 Id. at 149. 
20 Id. 
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A. Employment Discrimination 
 
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.21 Employment discrimination cases are generally placed 
within two categories, as Title VII prohibits both “disparate treatment” and 
“disparate impact” discrimination.22 Disparate treatment occurs when an 
employer intentionally discriminates based on a protected characteristic, whereas 
disparate impact occurs when a facially neutral employment practice or decision 
has a discriminatory effect.23 
To succeed in a disparate treatment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must 
establish purposeful discrimination under the three-part framework articulated by 
the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.24 First, 
plaintiffs must make a prima facie case by articulating that (1) they belong to a 
racial minority; (2) they applied and were qualified for a job for which the 
employer sought applicants; (3) despite their qualifications, they were rejected; 
(4) after their rejection, the employer left the position open and continued to seek 
applicants from people of the plaintiffs’ qualifications.25 Second, once a plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to “articulate26 
some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” for its rejection.27 Third, should the 
employer satisfy the burden of production, the burden then shifts back to the 
plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual for the 







21 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
22 Yvette Pappoe, The Shortcomings of Title VII for the Black Female Plaintiff, 22 U. PENN. J. L. & 
SOCIAL CHANGE 1, 4 (2019). 
23 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
24 McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
25 Id. at 802. 
26 Employers only have to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason; they do not have to prove that the 
articulated reason was the actual reason. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
248, 254 (1981) (“The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the 
proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to 
whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.”). 
27 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
28 Id. at 804. 
29 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (“The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion.”). 
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1. Intersectionality’s Legal Status 
 
Intersectionality is a framework through which people, and the law, can see where 
one’s various identities collide and interlock.30 As previously stated, Title VII 
protects against discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”31 Crenshaw and other intersectionality scholars have criticized 
Title VII’s use of the word “or,” as the word makes it difficult for plaintiffs to 
bring a claim on more than one protected category. 
Some courts have embraced intersectionality theory in Title VII to allow 
plaintiffs to bring claims under more than one protected category.32 The leading 
case that followed this practice is Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action 
Association.33 In Jefferies, the court asserted that “[t]he use of the word ‘or’ 
evidences Congress’s intent to prohibit employment discrimination based on any 
or all of the listed characteristics.”34 Most federal courts have followed the 
Jefferies approach, including a few circuit courts,35 concluding that Title VII “also 
protected individuals against discrimination based on the combination or 
‘intersection’ of two or more protected classifications, even in the absence of 
evidence showing the defendant discriminated solely on the basis of one protected 
classification.”36 Even the Supreme Court, albeit in dicta, favorably cited the 
Jefferies approach.37 Further, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) Compliance Manual states: 
 
Title VII prohibits discrimination not just because of one protected 
trait (e.g., race), but also because of the intersection of two or more 
protected bases (e.g., race and sex). For example, Title VII 
prohibits discrimination against African American women even if 
the employer does not discriminate against White women or 
African American men. Likewise, Title VII protects Asian 
 
30 “It’s not simply that there’s a race problem here, a gender problem here, and a class or LBGTQ 
problem there. Many times that framework erases what happens to people who are subject to all of 
these things.” Kimberlé Crenshaw on Intersectionality, More Than Two Decades Later, COLUM. 
L. SCH. (June 8, 2017), https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/archive/kimberle-crenshaw-
intersectionality-more-two-decades-later. 
31 43 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
32 See Diane Avery et al., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 47 (8th ed. 2010). 
33 Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980). 
34 Id. at 1032. 
35 Westmoreland v. Prince George’s Cty, 876 F. Supp. 2d 594, 604 (D. Md. 2012) (citing Lam v. 
Univ. of Hawai’i, 40 F.3d 1551, 1561-62 (9th Cir. 1994); Hucks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 
1406 (10th Cir. 1987); Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 327 (D. Md. 2003)). 
36 Brown v. OMO Group, Inc., 2017 WL 1148743, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 2017). 
37 See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 n. 10 (1999). 
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American women from discrimination based on stereotypes and 
assumptions about them “even in the absence of discrimination 
against Asian American men or White women.” The law also 
prohibits individuals from being subjected to discrimination 
because of the intersection of their race and a trait covered by 
another EEO statute––e.g., race and disability, or race and age.38 
 
Despite the law’s evolution toward embracing intersectionality in Title VII cases, 
statutory language has not changed nor has much of its interpretation.39 Many 
courts have refused to use an intersectional framework and instead require 
plaintiffs to choose only one of the protected categories.40 Forcing plaintiffs to 
choose only one protected category is problematic because those who face 
intersectional discrimination (i.e., Black women) must bisect their identity to take 
advantage of Title VII protections, leaving them without an adequate remedy.41 
 
2. Hair Discrimination 
 
One area that has gained traction in law and social discourse is “grooming codes 
discrimination”42 or discrimination on the basis of hairstyle. Grooming codes 
discrimination causes a “specific form of inequality and infringement upon one’s 
personhood resulting from the enactment and enforcement of formal as well as 
informal appearance and grooming mandates, which bear no relationship to one’s 
job qualifications and performance.”43 Black women are 1.5 times more likely to 
 
38 EEOC, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, DIRECTIVES TRANSMITTALS, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL 
3, 8-9 (2006), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/section-15-race-and-color-discrimination [hereinafter EEOC 
Compliance Manual]. 
39 See Bradley A. Areheart, Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, GEO. 
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 199, 214 (2006) (“Despite a number of court decisions that have validated 
intersectional claims, none of these decisions have generated enough publicity or been handed 
down by a court with sufficient authority to set a genuine precedent in an area lacking clear 
guidance”); see also Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-) History, 95 
B.U. L. REV. 713, 727 (2015) (“Despite the integral role of intersectional experiences in informing 
the origins and early development of Title VII, court opinions that acknowledged, much less 
discussed, intersectionality were few and far between.”). 
40 Pappoe, supra note 22, at 7. 
41 Id. 
42 “Grooming codes discrimination” was coined by D. Wendy Greene. D. Wendy Greene, Splitting 
Hairs: The Eleventh Circuit’s Take on Workplace Bans Against Black Women’s Natural Hair in 
EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 987 (2017). 
43 Id. at 990. 
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be sent home from work because of their hair,44 eighty percent more likely to feel 
required to change their hairstyle for work,45 and thirty percent more likely to be 
made aware of a grooming policy.46 Black women’s hair is 3.4 times more likely 
to be seen as unprofessional.47 If one conducted a Google search for 
“unprofessional hairstyles for women,” most of the images would be of Black 
women in natural hairstyles; conversely, a Google search for “professional 
hairstyles for women” boasts of mostly white women whom almost all have 
straight hair.48 Currently, Title VII does not protect against discrimination on the 
basis of hairstyle. 
The seminal case on Black hair, grooming restrictions, and the latter’s effect 
on Black women is Rogers v. American Airlines.49 Renee Rodgers, an American 
Airlines flight attendant, filed a suit under Title VII, arguing that the airline 
discriminated against her “as a woman, and more specifically a black woman” via 
its grooming policy that prohibited customer-contact employees, like flight 
attendants, from wearing braids.50 Rodgers asserted that cornrows, her hairstyle, 
have “special significance for black women” and have been “historically, a 
fashion and style adopted by Black American women, reflective of cultural, 
historical essence of the Black women in American society.”51 The district court 
separated Rodgers’ claim into two separate analyses: a sex discrimination 
analysis and a racial discrimination analysis.52 The court did not, as  Rodgers 
requested in her complaint, employ an intersectional analysis that accounted for 
both race and sex. 
The court first dismissed Rodger’s claim of gender discrimination on the 
ground that the prohibition on braids applied to both men and women.53 Further, 
the court reasoned that women wearing braids more often than men was 
 




48 See GOOGLE IMAGES, images.google.com. This has been criticized for several years without 
change. See also Leigh Alexander, Do Google’s ‘unprofessional hair’ results show it is racist?, 
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/08/does-
google-unprofessional-hair-results-prove-algorithms- racist. 
49 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The published case name misspells the plaintiff’s last name; 
the correct spelling is “Rodgers.” This article will use “Rodgers” when referring to the plaintiff 
and “Rogers” when referring to the case. See Paulette M. Caldwell, Intersectional Bias and the 
Courts: The Story of Rogers v. American Airlines, RACE LAW STORIES 571, 572 (2008) (revealing 
the misspelling and proper spelling of Rodgers). 
50 Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231. 
51 Id. at 231-32. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 231. 
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inconsequential, as the policy did not “regulate on the basis of any immutable 
characteristic of the employees.”54 The court then dismissed Rodgers’ claim of 
racial discrimination.55 The court underscored that the policy applied to all 
races,56 then it used the immutability doctrine to ground its distinguishable legal 
treatment of cornrows and afros.57 According to the court, federal protections 
against racial discrimination are limited to employers discriminating based on 
immutable characteristics.58 Immutable characteristics or traits are those “with 
which one is born, are fixed, difficult to change, and/or displayed by individuals 
who share the same racial identity.”59 Under this, the court reasoned that an 
actionable racial discrimination claim required evidence that showed Black 
people exclusively or predominantly wore braids.60 “By articulating this 
evidentiary standard, it appears that the Rogers court presumed that a workplace 
prohibition against afros constituted a form of race discrimination because 
African descendants predominantly or exclusively don or are born with an 
afro.”61 The court, however, noted that Rodgers “first appeared at work in the all-
braided hairstyle” soon after Bo Derek, a white actress, popularized cornrows 
(among non-Black people) while wearing them in a film.62 Because of this, the 
court reasoned that Rodgers did not meet its essentialist requirement and 
devalued the reality that cornrows have cultural significance.63 
Though the court conceded that a policy prohibiting afros might offend Title 
VII because afros fall under immutable characteristics, it contended that braids 
were different because the hairstyle was an “easily changed characteristic.”64 In 
short, the court dismissed Rodgers’ claims because the policy did “not regulate 
on the basis of any immutable characteristic” and it applied equally65 to both 
races and sexes.”66 It never addressed the intersectional claim as presented. 
A more recent example is found in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management 
 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 234. 
56 Id. at 231. 
57 Greene, supra note 42, at 998. 
58 Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231-32. 
59 Greene, supra note 42, at 998 (citing Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231-32). 
60 Id. (citing Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232). 
61 Id. 
62 Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 234. 
63 Greene, supra note 42, at 998-99 (citing Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232) (“The court effectively 
concluded that since a white woman braided her hair, donning cornrows could in no way inform 
Ms. Rodgers’ understand of herself as a Black woman.”). 
64 Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232. 
65 The themes from this article contend that the application was not, in fact, equal. 
66 Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title 
VII, 98 Geo L. J. 1080, 1091-92 (2010). 
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Solutions.67 In 2010, Chastity Jones applied to Catastrophe Management 
Solutions (“CMS”) to work in its call center, and CMS eventually offered Jones 
the job.68 To secure her schedule, Jones had to meet with the company’s human 
resources manager, Jeannie Wilson, a white woman.69 After meeting with 
Wilson, Jones prepared to leave. On her way out, Wilson asked whether Jones’ 
hair was in “dreadlocks,”70 to which Jones replied in the affirmative.71 Wilson 
then said she could not hire Jones “with the dreadlocks,” telling Jones, “they tend 
to get messy, although I’m not saying yours are, but you know what I’m talking 
about.”72 Wilson also told Jones that a Black male applicant cut his locs as a 
condition of employment, implying that Jones would have to do the same thing.73 
After Jones expressed that she would not cut her hair, Wilson rescinded the job 
offer and asked for Jones’ paperwork.74 Jones returned the paperwork then left.75 
The EEOC sued on behalf of Jones and was informed by critical race 
scholarship in its arguments. The EEOC first argued that the immutability 
doctrine is rooted in a now-debunked view of race as a biological construct 
instead of a social one.76 In order to maintain white superiority in practices like 
slavery or race-based violence, “social, political, and legal actors actively 
fostered notions of race and racial difference as inheritable and fixed.”77 Because 
of this, race has never been exclusively based on one’s skin color or heritage.78 
Historically and presently, mutable characteristics like one’s hair texture and 
hairstyle, dress, name, or accent have been treated as indicators of racial identity 
by both law and society.79 The EEOC then argued that distinguishing between 
natural hair growth and natural hairstyles as immutable and mutable, respectively, 
was disingenuous.80 Afros, braids, and locs are all ways to wear natural hair, so 
the styles are linked. 
Meaningfully, the EEOC highlighted the burdens and consequences Black 
 
67 852 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016). 
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 1021. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 852 F.3d 1018, 1021. 
73 Id. at 1021-22. 
74 Id. at 1022. 
75 Id. 
76 Greene, supra note 42, at 1009; Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Def. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions’ Mot. to 
Dismiss, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d (2014) (No. 13-cv-00476-CB-M), 
2014 WL 4745282, at *6 [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Brief]. 
77 Greene, supra note 42, at 1009. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1011; see Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 76. 
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women uniquely face from grooming codes that prohibit natural hairstyles. The 
EEOC explained that workplace prohibitions against afros, locs, braids, and 
twists effectively require Black women to wear straightened hair by way of 
weaves, wigs, or extensions or by applying extreme heat or chemical relaxers to 
their hair.81 The Commission noted that these methods of achieving and 
maintaining straightened hair are expensive, time-consuming, and damaging to 
Black women’s physical well-being.82 Further, these upkeep methods can also 
damage Black women’s emotional well-being.83 
A recent study found that Black women are more likely to spend more time 
on their hair than white women do, go to hair salons more often than white 
women do, spend more money on products for their hair than white women do, 
report higher levels of anxiety related to their hair compared to white women, are 
twice as likely to feel social pressure to straighten their hair for work, and are 
three times as likely to not engage in exercise and other physical activities 
because of their hair since maintaining straightened hair as a Black woman is a 
significant monetary and time investment.84 
The district court rejected the EEOC’s arguments and dismissed the 
complaint, holding the EEOC could not bring a plausible claim of intentional race 
discrimination.85 On appeal, the circuit first addressed the EEOC’s theory of 
liability. The court concluded that the EEOC was conflating disparate impact and 
disparate treatment theories of liability by describing the consequences of CMS’ 
policy with terms like “adverse effects,” “impact,” and “disadvantage.”86 
Following this, the circuit court did not consider the burdens or consequences of a 
locs ban on Black women.87 The court stated that its focus would be on analyzing 
whether the protected trait motivated American Airlines’ decision to impose its 
policy.88 To answer the question, the circuit court concluded that a protected trait 
under Title VII is one that an individual is “born with or cannot change.”89 The 
circuit court then reasoned that “discrimination on the basis of black hair texture 
(an immutable characteristic) is prohibited by Title VII, while adverse action on 
 
81 First Amended Complaint at ¶ 27, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 
(S.D. Ala. 2014) (No. 14-13482). 
82 Id.; Greene, supra note 42, at 1012. 
83 The “Good Hair” Study, Perception Institute, https://perception.org/goodhair (last visited Apr. 
21, 2021). 
84 Id. 
85 Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 11 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1144 (S.D. Ala. 2014). 
86 EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 837 F.3d 1156, 1158-1162 (11th Cir. 2016), withdrawn by 
EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016). 
87 Greene, supra note 42, at 1021. 
88EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 837 F.3d at 1163. 
89 EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 837 F.3d at 1172 n.4. 
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the basis of black hairstyle (a mutable choice) is not.”90 This resulted in the 
circuit court’s ruling that for locs to be seen as a racial instead of a cultural 
characteristic, plaintiffs would have to claim that locs were not a “function of 
personal choice, but rather that all, and/or only, individuals who identify as 
African descendants donned locks or are born with them.”91 Critical race theory 
teaches that such a task is impossible.92 
While courts are reluctant to protect Black women against hair 
discrimination, some legislative changes have been made. In 2019, the CROWN 
Coalition and Dove created the CROWN (Creating a Respectful and Open World 
for Natural Hair) Act. The CROWN Act’s purpose is to “ensure protection 
against discrimination based on race-based hairstyles by extending statutory 
protection to hair texture and protective styles such as braids, locs, twists, and 
knots in the workplace and public schools.”93 On July 3, 2019, California was the 
first state to sign the CROWN Act into law. After Deandre Arnold, an eighteen-
year-old Texas high schooler, was told he would not be able to graduate unless he 
cut his locs, Academy Award winner Matthew A. Cherry invited him to the 92nd 
Academy Awards show on February 9, 2020.94 The CROWN Act, which was 
already being discussed, received a boost when Cherry advocated for it in his 
acceptance speech. So far, the CROWN Act is law in nine states and recently 
passed in the United States House of Representatives.95 
 
B. Police Brutality 
 
Awareness of anti-Black police brutality and racial injustice in the United States 
is at an all-time high and steadily increasing since the killing of Michael Brown. 
On May 25, 2020, Derek Chauvin killed George Floyd, an unarmed Black man, 
by pressing his knee into Floyd’s neck for nine minutes and twenty-nine 
 
90 EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 837 F.3d at 1167 (11th Cir. 2016). 
91 Greene, supra note 42, at 1022 (citing EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 837 F.3d 1156 (11th 
Cir. 2016)). 
92 See, e.g., Ian Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, 
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 11 (1994) (“There are no genetic 
characteristics possessed by all Blacks but not by non-Blacks; similarly, there is no gene or cluster 
of genes common to all Whites but not to non-Whites.”). 
93 The CROWN Act, https://www.thecrownact.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2021). 
94 Amir Vera, What You Need to Know about the CROWN Act, CNN (Feb. 9, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/09/entertainment/crown-act-oscars-trnd/index.html. 
95 The CROWN Act, https://www.thecrownact.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2021) (States at the time 
of publication include California, New Jersey, New York, Colorado, Washington, Virginia, 
Maryland, Connecticut, and Delaware). 
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seconds.96 Floyd’s death, captured on video, went viral and sparked new life into 
the long and widespread movement against and debate on police brutality and 
racism in the United States. Protests and discourse worldwide have pressured 
police departments and politicians in the United States and abroad to come up 
with a solution. 
The general discourse around anti-Black police brutality does not largely 
include Black women. For the most part, statistics and discussions are either 
gender neutral97 or exclusively focused on Black men. Discussion on Black 
women who are victims and survivors of police brutality is rare. Because of this, 
finding information about Black women who have suffered from police brutality 
is laborious, allowing for Black women to be erased from the narrative and 
rendering them invisible.98 
 
1. Black Women and Black Men Experience Police Brutality Similarly 
 
This erasure of Black women is not the result of missing data. Black women’s 
experiences with police brutality often fall within commonly understood 
narratives used to discuss police brutality against Black men.99 
 
Even where women and girls are present in the data, narratives 
framing police profiling and lethal force as exclusively male 
experiences lead researchers, the media, and advocates to exclude 
them. For example, although racial profiling data are rarely, if 
ever, disaggregated by gender and race, when race and gender are 
considered together, researchers find that “for both men and 
women there is an identical pattern of stops by race/ethnicity.”100  
 
The killing of Breonna Taylor is a recent and popular101 example of Black women 
 
96 Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Prosecutors Say Derek Chauvin Knelt on George Floyd for 9 
Minutes 29 Seconds, Longer Than Initially Reported, N.Y. TIMES (March 30, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/us/derek-chauvin-george-floyd-kneel-9-minutes-29-
seconds.html.  
97 See e.g., People shot to death by U.S. police, by race 2017-2020, Statista (Nov. 30, 2020), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/585152/people-shot-to-death-by-us-police-by-race (a gender-
neutral reporting); Justin Nix et al., A Birds Eye View of Civilians Killed by Police in 2015: 
Further Evidence of Implicit Bias, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUBLIC POLICY 309 (2017) (discussing 
how Black people who were killed by police were twice as likely as white people to be unarmed). 
98 Say Her Name Report, supra note 10, at 4. 
99 Id. at 7. 
100 Id. at 4. 
101 As discussed throughout this paper, a Black woman who is a victim of police brutality rarely 
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falling within familiar police brutality narratives. On March 13, 2020, Taylor, a 
26-year-old Black female emergency medical technician, was asleep with her 
boyfriend when Louisville police officers forcibly entered her apartment.102 The 
police officers fired sixteen rounds of bullets into the apartment—six of those 
bullets struck and killed Taylor.103  
The killing of Mya Hall provides another example. National Security Agency 
(“NSA”) police killed Hall, a Black transgender woman, on March 30, 2015, in 
Baltimore, Maryland––just weeks before Freddie Gray’s death grabbed national 
headlines.104 Hall took a wrong turn onto NSA property and crashed into a 
security gate and police car.105 Though Hall was unarmed and nonthreatening to 
the facility, NSA officers did not attempt to use nonlethal force; instead, they 
fatally shot her.106 
 
2. Black Women and Black Men Experience Police Brutality Differently 
 
While Black women are killed by the police in situations and ways that are similar 
to those of Black men, Black women are also killed in gender-specific contexts 
(i.e., domestic violence responses).107 Further, police are less likely to protect 
Black women when their partners or community members murder, beat, or abuse 
them.108 The invisibility of Black women, especially in their unique experiences, 
leads to less demand for police accountability when police kill Black women. 
For example, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on December 22, 2002, Nizah 
Morris, a Black transgender woman, was found injured and unconscious.109 
Minutes before, police officers dropped Morris off at home.110 Thomas Berry, one 
of the police officers, returned to where Morris was reported to be bleeding and 
unconscious and, instead of helping her, covered “her face while she was still 
alive.”111 Morris was left, without help, at the scene of the crime for forty minutes 
 
becomes a household name. It should be noted that wide knowledge and subsequent outrage about 
Taylor’s death was not immediate but happened after several months. 
102 Richard A. Oppel Jr., et al., What to Know about Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/breonna-taylor-police.html. 
103 Id. 
104 Say Her Name Report, supra note 10, at 8. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 21. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 25. 
110 Say Her Name Report, supra note 10, at 25. 
111 Princess Harmony Rodriguez, Whose Lives Matter: Trans Women of Color and Police 
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before being taken to a hospital.112 She died two days later of a severe head 
injury, resulting from being beaten with the butt of a gun. Police claimed not to 
know what happened, and Morris’ death remains unsolved.113 The gender-specific 
violence perpetrated by police against Black women continues in 2021, with 
Black transgender women even more vulnerable. 
 
3. Why Include Black Women? 
 
Including Black women and girls in the discourse around police brutality is 
needed for several reasons. To start, more inclusive discussion broadens the 
narrative and enhances the understanding of the structural relationship between 
Black communities and the police.114 “Acknowledging and analyzing the 
connections between anti-Black violence against Black men, women, transgender 
[people], and gender-nonconforming people reveals systemic realities that go 
unnoticed when the focus is limited exclusively to cases involving [cisgender 
Black men].”115 Society cannot fully consider all of the ways Black people are 
victimized by police brutality until it considers all Black people. 
Another reason why centering all Black lives in police brutality discourse is 
important is that it allows society to realize that isolated “fixes” are not 
effective.116 Ultimately, including Black women and girls in police brutality 
discourse signals that all Black lives matter.117 Families of Black women who 
were killed by the police are less likely to be invited to speak at rallies and do not 
receive the same level of media attention, political consideration, or community 
support as do families grieving Black men killed by the police.118 Black women 
and girls deserve the same level of collective outrage that Black men and boys 
receive when they are brutalized and killed by police with impunity. 
 
IV. THE BASIS OF OUR PRESENT TROUBLE 
 
Bringing visibility to Black women in the eyes of the law and social justice 
movements is not easy. The problem of Black women’s invisibility is rooted in a 
 
Violence, BGD (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.bgdblog.org/2014/12/whose-lives-matter-trans-
women-color-police-violence/. 
112 Say Her Name Report, supra note 10, at 25. 
113 Id. 




118 Say Her Name Report, supra note 10, at 7. 
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historical system of oppression that is based on lies and omissions. The 
relationship between Black women and the state was birthed in violence fueled by 
those lies and omissions.119 Masters of the enslaved could legally kill, maim, and 




Black women’s enslavement was marked by sexual abuse and rape, driven by 
white people’s moral depravity or economics.122 To justify it, white people 
claimed that “Black women were lascivious, wild creatures without morals, who 
needed to be tamed in order to get any work out of them.”123 
The violence Black women experienced was often, and is still, as deeply 
rooted in gender as in color.124 An immense part of that dually rooted violence 
includes the rape and sexual assault of Black women––practices maintained by 
false narratives created and protected by tropes, stereotypes, and law. In the Jim 
Crow era, a century of legal racial segregation, white men continued to sexually 
assault and kill Black women. During this time, the law not only failed to protect 
Black women but also helped those who harmed them.125 The dehumanization of 
 
119 Michelle S. Jacobs, The Violent State: Black Women’s Invisible Struggle Against Police 
Violence, 24 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 39, 44 (2017). 
120 A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR, RACE & THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 36 (1978). 
121 “[T]he people . . . who settled the country had a fatal flaw. They could recognize a man when 
they saw one. They knew . . . he wasn’t anything else but a man. But since they were Christian, 
and since they had already decided that they came here to establish a free country, the only way to 
justify the role this chattel was playing in one’s life was to say that he was not a man, because if 
he wasn’t a man then no crime had been committed. That lie is the basis of our present trouble.” 
James Baldwin, Address at Second Baptist Church (May 10, 1963) (transcript available in the 
American Archive of Public Broadcasting). 
122 See Jacobs, supra note 119, at 44-45 (“When importation was banned, the holders turned 
towards making their own human captives, frequently by raping Black women or ‘breeding’ them 
(often against their will) with other Black male slaves.”); see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING 
THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY, 24 (1997) (“The 
essence of Black women’s experience during slavery was the brutal denial of autonomy over 
reproduction. Female slaves were commercially valuable to their masters not only for their labor, 
but also for their ability to produce more slaves. The law made slave women’s children the 
property of the slaveowner. White masters therefore could increase their wealth by controlling 
their slaves’ reproductive capacity. With owners expecting natural multiplication to generate as 
much as 5 to 6 of their profit, they had a strong incentive to maximize their slaves’ fertility.”). 
123 Jacobs, supra note 119, at 45. 
124 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, STAN. L. REV., 581, 598 
(1990). 
125 See Ruth Thompson-Miller & Leslie H. Picca, “There Were Rapes!”: Sexual Assaults of 
African American Women and Children in Jim Crow, 23 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 934, 935-36 
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Black women by white people continued as they created tropes about Black 
women’s inherent promiscuity.126  
One false, dominant narrative about Black women was the Jezebel stereotype. 
While white men portrayed white women as models of self-control, modesty, and 
sexual purity, they simultaneously portrayed Black women as animals––
specifically, sexual animals who lacked control over their libido.127 Black women 
were caricatured as “purely lascivious creature[s]: not only [were they] governed 
by [their] erotic desires, but [their] sexual prowess led men to wanton passion.”128 
These historical tropes birthed stereotypes and false narratives that continue to 
dominate today’s minds, laws, and policies; further, those false narratives serve as 
the foundation for how the country and, specifically, the government sees (or does 
not see) Black women and the violence perpetrated against them. 
Unsurprisingly, another false, dominant narrative about Black women was 
that they were inherent liars.129 During slavery, Black people could not testify in 
court against white people, as they were considered incapable of being honest.130 
“[African women were believed to be] ignorant, . . . treacherous, thiev[es] and 
mistrustful.”131 This narrative also continued postbellum and remained in the 
courts.132 Social scientists who study prosecutions of rape cases have noted jurors’ 
resistance to believing Black women, and judges tend to consider the testimony of 
Black women as less credible than the testimony of others.133 
 
(2017); see also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The “Law Only As an Enemy”: 
The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws 
of Virginia, 70 N. C. L. REV. 969, 1056-57 (1992) (outlining states whose laws explicitly defined 
rape as a crime that could only be committed against white women and states whose laws did not 
have that language but whose courts did not prosecute rapes against Black women). 
126 DEBORAH G. WHITE, AR’N’T I A WOMAN? FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH 126 
(1985); See Jacobs, supra note 119, at 46. 
127 The Jezebel Stereotype, Ferris State University, https://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/jezebel/; 
WHITE, supra note 126, at 38. 
128 ROBERTS, supra 122, at 10-11. 
129 Jacobs, supra note 119, at 48. 
130 Higginbotham & Jacobs, supra note 125 at 994-97; THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY 
AND THE LAW, 1619–1860, at 232 (1996). 
131 Marilyn Yarbrough & Crystal Bennett, Cassandra and the “Sistahs”: The Peculiar Treatment 
of African American Women in the Myth of Women as Liars, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 625, 635 
(2000) (citing Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bath Water, Racial Imagery and 
Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WISC. L. 
REV. 1003, 1033 (1995)). 
132 For example, a judge in a 1912 case wrote, “This court will never take the word of a nigger 
against the word of a white man.” Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 158. 
133 Gary LaFree et al., Rape and Criminal Justice: The Social Construction of Sexual Assault, Vol. 
71 I. 2, 219-20 (1989) (quoting a juror who said, “[n]egroes have a way of not telling the truth. 
They’ve a knack for coloring the story. So you know you can’t believe everything they say.”; see 
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The narratives of Black women as immoral, oversexed creatures protected the 
white men who brutalized them.134 More troubling was that the law echoed those 
narratives, and in the eyes of the law, Black women could not be raped.135 Lies 
about Black women led to the sequential omission of accounts of sexual violence 
perpetrated against them. During American slavery, the rape of a Black woman by 
any man of any race was not a crime; rape statutes defined rape only as a crime 
against white women.136 “The crime of rape does not exist in this State between 
African slaves,” a defense attorney argued in George v. State.137 “The regulations 
of law, as to the white race, on the subject of sexual intercourse, do not and 
cannot, for obvious reasons, apply to slaves; their intercourse is promiscuous, and 
the violation of a female slave by a male slave would be a mere assault and 
battery.”138 Further, the narrative of Black women being dishonest closed the door 
for Black survivors of sexual violence to be believed. Literature on sexual 
violence and Black women in the United States is scarce, as the discourse around 
sexual violence still largely centers on white women.139 The false narrative of 
Black women’s hypersexuality––and Black women’s vulnerability to being sexual 
assault––continued postbellum and remain relevant to current issues regarding 




A recent study found that white people were more likely to “implicitly and 
explicitly superhumanize” Black people.140 Another study found that white 
people, including white medical students and healthcare professionals, were more 
likely to believe that Black people’s bodies are unable to feel pain, have “less 
sensitive nerve endings,” and are “biologically different” from and stronger than 
white people’s bodies.141 These current beliefs are also rooted in historical lies 
 
also Geneva Brown, Ain’t I a Victim: The Intersection of Race, Class and Gender in Domestic 
Violence and the Courtroom, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 147, 154-55 (2012). 
134 Jacobs, supra note 119, at 47. 
135 Harris, supra note 124, at 599. 
136 See Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 103, 118 (1983); 
see also MORRIS, supra note 130, at 305. 
137 37 Miss. 316, 318 (1859). 
138 Id. 
139 Harris, supra note 124, at 598. 
140 Jesse Singal, White People Think Black People Are Magical, THE CUT (Nov. 14, 2014), 
https://www.thecut.com/2014/11/white-people-think-black-people-are-magical.html; Adam Waytz 
et al., A Superhumanization Bias in Whites’ Perceptions of Blacks, 6 Soc. Psy. and Personality Sci. 
352, 352 (2014). 
141 Kelly M. Hoffman et al., Racial bias in pain assessment and treatment recommendations, and 
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about Black people.142 While this false narrative most obviously implicates issues 
in the healthcare sector, particularly for Black women, it also carries implications 
in police brutality. The superhumanizing of Black people––most often Black men 
but also Black women––can lead to Black women being “treated punitively, denied 




Eradicating double-discrimination on the basis of race and gender will not be 
simple nor found in a single solution. To tackle the unique employment 
discrimination Black women face, all three branches of government must take 
action to acknowledge and make space for Black women in the intersection. To 
properly address police brutality, policymakers and individuals must advocate and 
learn through an intersectional framework. People and structures in power must 
work separately and collectively toward Black women’s equality. 
 
A. Employment Discrimination 
 
The governmental branches should exercise their powers to address intersectional 
discrimination. The EEOC should provide guidance on interpreting Title VII, 





The EEOC has acknowledged intersectional discrimination;144 however, it did not 
provide courts with guidance on how to interpret Title VII to allow for actionable 
intersectional claims.145 The EEOC should issue clear guidelines for the judiciary 
regarding intersectional claims.146 Doing so would allow courts to acknowledge 
that intersectional discrimination is cognizable and help them create an analytical 
framework for adjudicating intersectional claims.147 
 
 
false beliefs about biological differences between blacks and whites, 113 PNAS 4296, 4298 
(2016). 
142 Waytz et al., supra note 140, at 352-53. 
143 Say Her Name Report, supra note 10, at 18. 
144 EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 38. 
145 Pappoe, supra note 22, at 17. 
146 Id. at 18. 
147 Id. 
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Congress should amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to clearly state that 
discrimination is prohibited on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. Others have suggested that the language should include “or any 
combination thereof” at the end of the list of protected categories.148 A change of 




Courts that have not yet joined the ranks of those that have adopted an 
intersectional framework for distinct discrimination claims should do so. If courts 
unanimously use an intersectional analytical framework, Black women in all parts 
of the country can make more holistic claims in court without needing to bisect 
their identity in hopes of receiving some protection. To achieve this, courts should 
account for the sociopolitical and legal history of Black women when crafting this 
framework.149 
 
B. Police Brutality 
 
Policymakers should form agendas and platforms that view issues through an 
intersectional framework. This gender-inclusive lens will better address police 
violence because the myriad of ways Black people are affected will be seen.150 
Policymakers should also support and introduce gender-specific policies to 
address the unique issues Black women experience with police.151 Individuals 
should be diligent to discover and uplift the names and stories of Black women 
who suffer from police brutality. At protests and demonstrations, in public spaces 
or private homes, individuals can search for a Black woman and say her name. 
For a Black woman’s name to be said, her name must first be seen. One by one, 




In seeking to make a living and claim space in social justice movements, Black 
women are fighting for visibility in their life and death. Black women have a unique 
 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 21. 
150 Id. at 31. 
151
Pappoe, supra note 22, at 31. 
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identity because they are at the intersection of at least two protected categories: race 
and gender. However, the country’s legal system and social justice movements do 
little to see Black women and their unique identity in that intersection. This 
invisibility precludes Black women from enjoying legal protections, social value, 
and, ultimately, freedom. Black people cannot be free until all Black people are free. 
True liberation can only be found by first unearthing historical lies and omissions that 
inform and have formed today’s problems. After that unearthing, society must tell the 
truth and do the work to make its spaces more inclusive of those in the intersection. 
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